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1 Introduction
A recurrent question that characterizes the debate on economic growth refers to
the e¤ect of schooling on income per capita. Pritchett (2001) argues that the poor
institutional framework, low quality and excess supply of schooling in developing
countries causes it to have a virtually null marginal e¤ect on income per worker.
Evidence reported by Temple (2001) supports the Pritchett hypothesis. Paralleling
these results a number of panel data studies have also failed to nd any signicance of
schooling in standard growth regressions (Bond, Hoe­ er and Temple, 2001; Caselli,
Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; Islam 1995).
The purpose of this paper is to produce fresh estimates of the social return on
schooling. This is not a paper about why changes in years of schooling cannot
explain per capita income growth between 1960 and a later date, as rst noted by
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). This has already been addressed by Krueger and
Lindahl (2001) and Cohen and Soto (2007) who single out measurement error in
years of schooling as the central cause behind this nding. Instead, the focus here
is on how to compute reliable estimates of the social return on schooling given the
estimation problems found in the literature.
Here the term returncalls for a clarication. In the same way that the micro
Mincer coe¢ cient from wage regressions cannot be interpreted as the internal rate
of return of education but as the causal e¤ect of schooling on wages (Card, 1999;
Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2005), in this paper the macro Mincerian return is
interpreted as the e¤ect of schooling on GDP per worker. So the terms e¤ect of
schoolingor return on schoolingwill be used interchangeably.
In part due to econometric di¢ culties, the literature has recently turned more
attention to development accounting (Caselli, 2005; Hall and Jones 1999). This
approach relies on the use of unknown parameters describing the returns on physical
and human capital. Although this paper is complementary to this literature, the
estimated returns on schooling found here are di¤erent from those typically used in
development accounting. In particular, richer countries tend to display higher social
returns as a consequence of better education quality.
Assuming return homogeneity across countries, the benchmark estimate of the
income response to one additional year of schooling is 8:3%. This is in the range of
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the micro-Mincerian returns reported by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos (2004). The average social return exceeds the standard private return
found in micro studies only if physical capital is assumed to respond to changes in
human capital.
The average return conceals substantial heterogeneity across countries. Two
additional results emerge from the data. First, the macro Mincer coe¢ cients bear no
relationship with the micro coe¢ cients reported by Psacharopoulos. In particular,
schooling has no signicant e¤ect on aggregate income for the group of countries
with the highest micro Mincer coe¢ cients. And second, schooling has no signicant
e¤ect on income in countries with low educational quality. This result leads to
the nding that factor accumulation explains a larger share of income di¤erences
across countries than generally reported in the development accounting literature.
This nding is consistent with Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) who argue that
the actual levels of human capital in developing countries are less favourable than
usually depicted in studies that do not account for educational quality di¤erences.
In summary, contrary to earlier ndings, the causal e¤ect of education on income
is positive and statistically signicant in countries with relatively high schooling
quality as reported by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). But on average the macro
Mincer coe¢ cients are not higher than private ones. This last result is in line with
the ndings of Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996), Acemoglu and Angrist
(2001), Pritchett (2006) or Ciccone and Peri (2006), who following a di¤erent (i.e.
micro) approach do not detect signicant externalities to schooling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark estimation
assuming that the return on schooling is constant across countries. The estimates
from GMM regressions are signicant and consistent with results from labour stud-
ies. Section 3 allows for return heterogeneity across countries and assesses the ef-
fects of educational quality. It is found that in low educational quality countries the
returns are not statistically signicant whereas in countries with high quality the
return is consistent with those found in labour studies. Section 4 presents an income
accounting decomposition using the returns of schooling estimated in this paper. It
is found that factor accumulation has a substantially larger role in explaining income
di¤erences across countries than what is usually described in the literature. Section
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5 sets this paper in the context of the earlier literature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Benchmark Estimation
The benchmark estimation is inspired by Topel (1999) and Cohen and Soto (2007).
From a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with physical and human capital
and constant returns we can write:
ln yit =  ln kit + (1  ) lnhit + i +  t + eit (1)
where yit, kit and hit respectively represent income, physical capital and human
capital per worker. The disturbance i represents an unobserved time-invariant
country-specic e¤ect,  t is a time-specic e¤ect and eit is residual. Suppose that
the representative level of human capital per worker is such that:
lnhit = rSit + "it (2)
where S is the average number of years of schooling for the working-age population
and " captures other determinants of human capital 1. Therefore (1) yields the
following estimable equation:
ln yit =  ln kit + (1  ) rSit + i +  t + it (3)
with it  (1  ) "it + eit.
To eliminate collinearity between physical and human capital Topel (1999) sug-
gests reparametrizing the model. By subtracting  ln y from both sides of equation
(3) and dividing by (1  ) we obtain,
ln yit =

1   ln

k
y

it
+ rSit + ~i + ~ t +~it (4)
where a tilde denotes variables divided by (1  ).
Note that the parameter r is not directly comparable with micro Mincer returns
because it is a parameter that converts years of schooling into human capital and
not into income. Indeed, the micro-Mincer coe¢ cient is dened as the percentage
1The original Mincerian equation also includes labour experience, which is not explicitely accounted for
here.
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increase in wages given an increase in years of schooling, leaving the remaining
determinants of wages constant. From equation (4) it is clear that r represents the
e¤ect of schooling on income allowing for an endogenous change in physical capital
so that the k=y ratio remains constant. Consequently, in macro regressions it is
the coe¢ cient (1  ) r which should be compared with the estimates of the e¤ect
of schooling on wages (see equation 3). However most of the existing literature
compares the estimates of r with the Mincer coe¢ cient from labour studies. The
appendix formally shows that in the absence of externalities the private return is
equal to (1  ) r.
In all subsequent regressions the period covered is 1960-1990 and the data is
from PWT 5.6 in order to maintain the same income and growth data studied in the
earlier literature. The physical capital series are from Easterly and Levine (2001)
and the data for years of schooling is from Cohen and Soto (2007). The number of
countries with full information for at least three decades is 832.
The reparametrisation (4) introduces new endogeneity problems to the estimation
as the income level now appears on both sides of the equation. Topel (1999) has
already estimated equation (4) by constraining the coe¢ cient  to specic values
(he chooses 0:35 and 0:5) or by assuming that the ratio k=y is constant for each
country over time. Under this last assumption he treats k=y as a country specic
e¤ect and estimates (4) by xed-e¤ect and OLS methods. Heckman and Klenow
(1997) also estimate a constrained version of (4) by OLS.
In Cohen and Soto (2007) we estimate an unconstrained version of equation
(4). For benchmark purposes such regressions are replicated for the larger sample
available here. The main results are reported in Table 1. The OLS estimation in
levels (column 1) results in an implausibly low coe¢ cient for the capital-output ratio.
Indeed, the implicit share of physical capital in total output is 0:221=1:221 = 0:1813.
This negative bias is the consequence of the presence of y in the capital-output ratio.
By contrast, the coe¢ cient for schooling is large (21:7%) and highly signicant.
This value reects the return on schooling that allows physical capital to adjust to
changes in S so that the ratio k=y stays constant. However, as discussed above, the
Mincerian-comparable return of one additional year of schooling i.e. the increase
2The full data set used here is available at http://soto.iae-csic.org/Data.htm
3No statistical inference is performed on  since the standard errors refer to the estimated =(1  ).
5
in income per worker that would be obtained without an endogenous response of k
is 0:217  (1   0:181) = 17:8%. This gure is still large and its size is in part due
to the low coe¢ cient for the capital-output ratio. Similar problems apply for the
estimation in rst-di¤erences (column 2), which explains a negative .
Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000) show that
in nite samples a system GMM estimation, i.e. the simultaneous estimation of the
equation in levels and in rst di¤erences with suitably chosen lags of explanatory
variables used as instruments, provide more precise estimates and lower biases than
traditional estimators. Columns (3) and (4) report results from system GMM regres-
sions that use two di¤erent sets of instruments. In both regressions the instruments
used for the equation in rst di¤erences are a constant and the level of explanatory
variables lagged one period. For the equation in levels the instruments are a con-
stant and the rst-di¤erence of explanatory variables lagged one period (regression
3) or one and two periods (regression 4).
The GMM estimation produces signicant coe¢ cients for both the capital-output
ratio and years of schooling. Not surprisingly the implicit share of physical capital
(around 46:0%) is higher than the one obtained in OLS estimation. It is also larger
than the typical capital share used in the literature. The implicit social Mincerian
returns (between 7:4% and 8:3%) are larger than those reported by Topel (1999;
table 2, column 5) who, conditioning on a physical capital share of 35%, nds a
marginal e¤ect of schooling equal to 5:5%. On the other hand, the results found
here imply that the marginal e¤ect of schooling at a macro level is slightly lower
than the standard private return observed in labour studies. For instance, from
around seventy country-level studies, Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos (2004) report, respectively, a world average Mincerian return equal to
10:1% and 9:7%. Consequently, if micro returns are taken at face value, these results
indicate an absence of externalities to schooling4. This nding is consistent with
Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd (1996), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), Pritchett
(2003) and Ciccone and Peri (2006), among others.
On the other hand, if an increase in the level of human capital induces an expan-
sion of physical capital such that k=y remains constant the macro return to schooling
4There is a large amount of literature on whether the micro returns are properly estimated but this topic
goes far beyond the scope of this paper. The micro Mincer coe¢ cients are used only as a reference.
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would be higher than the typical private one. Indeed, under this assumption the to-
tal return to schooling ranges between 13:6% and 15:5% depending on the regression.
However, this larger long-term Mincerian return does not represent externalities in
the sense o¤ered by Lucas (1988). In Lucass model, the social marginal product
of human capital is higher than the private marginal product in the short-run i.e.
without taking into consideration any hypothetical endogenous response of physi-
cal capital. Therefore in order to analyse whether these externalities show up in
the data we must compare the short-run return with the typical micro Mincerian
coe¢ cient. And the results in Table 1 indicate the absence of such externalities.
If the explanatory variables are endogenously determined the assumption of no
autocorrelation in the residuals it is crucial for the validity of the instruments. Oth-
erwise past values of explanatory variables, which are used as instruments, would
not be exogenous. When the residuals are not serially correlated the rst order cor-
relation of di¤erenced residuals it it 1 is negative and the second order correlation
is equal to zero. Tests for second order serial correlation reject the hypothesis that
such correlation is present in the residuals. As an additional test of the validity of
instruments Table 1 reports Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions. In neither
regression is the validity of the instruments rejected.
3 Return Heterogeneity
The previous section assumes, consistently with most of the earlier literature, that
the macro return on schooling is the same across countries. However there are the-
oretical and empirical reasons to believe that the social returns on schooling di¤er
across countries. On the theoretical ground, the hypothesis that human capital has
decreasing returns with the level of schooling has been put forward by Bils and
Klenow (2000). Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) assume decreas-
ing Mincerian returns to build human capital stocks for their income accounting
analyses.
The decreasing return hypothesis is in fact founded on the private Mincerian re-
turns reported by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).
These studies report major di¤erences across world regions with, on average, richer
and better educated countries having lower private returns. However this is far from
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being a perfect regularity and there are a number of exceptions. For instance, ac-
cording to Psacharopoulos and Patrinos the latest estimates for Japan and Singapore
are 13:2% and 13:1%, respectively, whereas those for South Africa and Egypt are
4:1% and 5:5%, respectively. Although private and social Mincerian returns are not
necessarily connected, there is still a chance that they are. If so, the observed het-
erogeneity in labour studies would indicate major di¤erences in Mincerian returns
at the aggregate level.
Another piece of empirical evidence suggesting return heterogeneity is provided
by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). There the authors report substantial di¤erences
in schooling quality across countries. Di¤erences in schooling quality may lead to
di¤erences in labour productivity and thus cause return heterogeneity. Pritchett
(2001) supports this idea by arguing that the low quality of schooling is one ma-
jor cause of the lack of signicance of schooling variables in cross-country growth
regressions5.
Lets introduce heterogeneity by assuming that the parameter ri is given by:
ri = r + i (5)
where r is the world average return and i is the country deviation from the world
average.
In order to assess the e¤ects of return heterogeneity it is convenient to illustrate
its consequences for cross-section regressions. When the income level is regressed
on years of schooling a potential source of bias of the estimated r emerges as the
term iSi is present in the residual of the equation. The sign of the bias depends on
the sign of the correlation ;S between i and Si. According to the micro evidence
presented by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) the
return on years of schooling is on average lower in countries with higher levels of
education. This would suggest that ;S is negative. This, in turn, would imply
that cross-country regressions that do not account for di¤erences in returns across
countries produce downwardly biased estimates of r.
A di¤erent scenario has been put forward by Pritchett (2001, 2003) who argues
that the social return on schooling is relatively lower in developing countries be-
5Note that in that case, countries with higher levels of schooling which are also those with better quality
should display higher returns. This is contradicted by Psacharopouloss numbers.
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cause of their limited educational quality, among other reasons. On similar lines,
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) highlight that schooling quality di¤ers considerably
among countries and in general it is lower in the poorer and less educated ones.
Under this hypothesis, since more educated countries benet from higher schooling
quality their ri should be relatively high. In that case ;S would be positive and
the estimated r would be upwardly biased.
Of course this analysis neglects the potential endogeneity of S, which would also
positively bias the estimated r in growth regressions. As is well known instrumental
variable methods do not solve the endogeneity problem introduced by heterogeneity
since any instrument that is correlated with Si is also correlated with iSi (Heckman
and Vytlacil, 1998).
To assess the e¤ects of return heterogeneity in panel regressions lets write Sit =
si + dit where si is the sample average of years of schooling and dit is the deviation
from the average. Suppose that ri is given by (5). Then equation (4) can be rewritten
as,
ln yit =

1   ln

k
y

it
+ rSit + vi (si + dit) + uit (6)
Now a new source of bias is introduced by the presence of the term vidit (the
term visi is part of the countrys specic e¤ect and thus can be accounted for with
standard econometric techniques). Neglecting other possible sources of bias it can
readily be shown that the sign of the bias introduced by the presence of heterogeneity
is equal to the sign of E
 
vi
2
i

, where 2i is country is sample variance of years of
schooling. As before, the use of instruments does not solve the bias problem since
any variable correlated with Sit is also correlated with vidit (see Garen, 1984).
3.1 Evidence from micro returns
As a rst attempt to deal with heterogeneity we will exploit results from labour
studies. Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) report pri-
vate Mincerian coe¢ cients for 55 of all countries used here. The average Mincerian
coe¢ cient for these countries is 10%. In addition there is little variation in returns
over time which is consistent with a time-invariant ri as in (5). In order to study
whether the private returns convey information about the social returns, the sample
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is divided into groups of countries according to their private returns. Then a specic
social return for each group can be estimated as follows:
ln yit =

1   ln

k
y

it
+
X
j=1;2;3
rjDjSit + uit (7)
where Dj is a dummy variable that takes value 1 depending on whether the private
Mincer return of country i is "low", "medium" or "high". The thresholds dening
these three groups are respectively (and arbitrarily) 8%; from 8% to 11%, and over
11%6.
Table 2 reports the main results with system GMM estimation. For benchmark
purposes, the rst regression ignores heterogeneity. This is the same as regression 4
in table 1 but for the smaller sample of 55 countries for which private Mincerian coef-
cients are available. The results are similar to those obtained with the full sample,
with a point estimate for r equal to 13:9% (the implicit social Mincerian return is
equal to 7:2%). The low p-value for the Sargan statistic hints at high heterogeneity
among the countries in this smaller sample. In regression 2 the groups with low
and moderate private returns display highly signicant coe¢ cients for schooling and
respectively equal to 12:9% and 13:8%. The implicit social Mincerian returns are,
respectively, 7:8% and 8:3%. These are "close" to the observed private returns for
these two groups (respectively, 6:3% and 9:5%). In contrast, countries with high
private returns yield, paradoxically, a low and non-signicant coe¢ cient. The im-
plicit social Mincerian return for this group of countries is 4:9%, which is almost 10
percentage points lower than their average private return. Regression 3 pools group
1 and 2 together but the results are not signicantly modied.
The ndings in table 2 suggest that the micro returns are not related to the
social ones. Indeed, the group of countries with relatively large micro-returns has
lower than average social returns in the sample. Finally, it is important to highlight
that return heterogeneity across countries is considerable, as is suggested by the low
p-values in Sargan tests. In fact, it is possible that countries classied into group 3
are themselves highly heterogeneous. This could be one reason, among others, for a
non-signicant estimate for these countries.
6Other thresholds were tried but the results reported below did not change qualitatively.
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3.2 Quality of education
One natural candidate to explain heterogeneity in social Mincerian returns is the
quality of education. As noted above, Pritchett (2001) justies the lack of signi-
cance of schooling in cross-country growth regressions by the low quality of education
in developing countries. Consistently with this Hanushek and Kimko (2000) nd that
education quality has a strong explanatory power for growth.
The following regressions explore how the quality of education may impact on
the social return on schooling. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) construct two di¤er-
ent measures of schooling quality from a number of international tests of student
achievement in mathematics and science carried out during the 1965-1991 period.
The authors argue that schooling quality varies slowly over time in a given country,
which allows them to combine the results of the tests from di¤erent years. The two
measures that they build di¤er in the way the various tests conducted in each coun-
try are merged into a single score (see Hanushek and Kimko, 2000, pp. 1186-1187
for further details). Since the authors report a high correlation between the two
measures (0:92), in this paper the simple average of the two quality scores reported
by Hanushek and Kimko (2000, pp. 1206-1207) is computed. Furthermore, to facil-
itate the interpretation of the results the measure of quality is scaled to 1 for the
country with the highest score in the sample (Singapore). The quality measure qi
for each country i obtained in this way is shown in the appendix.
The rst regression in Table 3 is the baseline estimation for the smaller sample
of 67 countries with available data on education quality and years of schooling. In
this regression the coe¢ cient for schooling is constrained to a common value for all
countries in the sample. The Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator
is performed. The instruments are the same as before: for the equation in rst
di¤erences, a constant and the level of explanatory variables lagged one period; and
for the equation in levels, a constant and up to two lags of explanatory variables
in rst di¤erences. Regression 1 shows that there are no important di¤erences with
respect to the full-sample results. Namely, the coe¢ cient for schooling in both
regressions are not statistically di¤erent. The implicit social Mincerian return is
8:4% which is virtually the same as in the benchmark regression in table 1. Note
however that according to the Sargan statistic the exogeneity of the instruments
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is rejected at a 10% level. As discussed before, the instruments are rendered non
signicant when parameter heterogeneity occurs (Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998).
Next countries are classied into di¤erent groups depending on their quality level
qi so that a di¤erent coe¢ cient for schooling can be estimated for each group. Such
an estimation o¤ers the advantage of not needing to specify how quality a¤ects the
return on schooling7. On the other hand, this approach supposes that all countries
in a quality group have the same return. The criteria for the number of groups
and the limits of q that dene each group are obtained endogenously from the data.
More specically, the sample is rst divided into two groups, one with countries with
low q and the other with high q. Initially the low-q group has the smallest number
of countries needed for estimation and the remaining countries go into the high-q
group. After estimation the lowest quality country from the high-q group is moved
into the low-q group and a new estimation is performed. This procedure is applied
recursively. As noted above, when parameter heterogeneity is not accounted for, any
instrumental variable correlated with the explanatory one will be correlated with the
residual. Thus, under heterogeneity the Sargan statistic should reject the exogeneity
of the instruments. Therefore, if the Sargan statistic worsens signicantly between
two consecutive estimations it is a sign that the country that has just been moved
into the low-q group is better placed among the high-q group.
Figure 1 displays the probability values of the Sargan statistic obtained with this
recursive procedure. Each point represents the p-value obtained when the corre-
sponding country is included in the low-q group. There are at least two instances in
which there is an almost vertical drop in Sargans p-values. This suggests estimat-
ing di¤erent coe¢ cients for three groups of countries: a group with "low" education
quality (up to Iraqs level); a group with "intermediate" quality (from Syria up to
Cameroon); and a group with "high" quality (equal to or higher than Jordans).
This analysis leads to an estimation similar to (7) but now the Dj dummy is
conveniently redened according to each countrys q. Regression 2 shows that the low
and intermediate quality groups (respectively groups 1 and 2) display non-signicant
coe¢ cients. In contrast, schooling is signicant for the high-quality group (group
3). For this group the long-term return is about 10% which is around 40% less than
7 In Gundlach, Rudman and Wossmann (2002) a quality measure is multiplied by the number of years of
schooling Sit. That approach assumes that quality and quantity are perfect substitutes.
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the value obtained when heterogeneity is ignored (see regression 1). As discussed
earlier in this section, the positive bias observed when heterogeneity is ignored is an
indication that countries with larger increases in average years of schooling in the
sample correspond on average to countries with relatively high social returns.
On the other hand, the improvement in the Sargan statistic (its p-value is equal
to 25:5%) suggests that accounting for heterogeneity in this way produces more
accurate estimates. The lack of signicance of the schooling variable for groups 1
and 2 may be due to a small sample bias. But when the countries in those groups
are pooled together (regression 3), the results do not show major changes. Schooling
for group 2 is signicant only if it is merged with group 3 (regression 4). But the
substantial fall in Sargans p-value raises doubts about the suitability of such pooling.
Finally, when group 3 is itself split into two groups (regression 5)8 the coe¢ cient for
schooling is virtually the same for both high quality groups and is not signicant for
the remaining countries in the sample.
Overall, these results suggest that years of schooling are signicant for countries
with a relatively high quality of education whereas it is not signicant for countries
with low levels of schooling quality. We can measure the di¤erence between the
social returns implicit in table 3 and the private returns reported by Psacharopoulos
(1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) in order to obtain a crude assess-
ment of the "excess" return in each country. If the coe¢ cients for schooling from
regression 5 are transformed into Mincerian-equivalent values (by multiplying them
by (1  )) we obtain 0:4%, 3:6%, 8:1% and 8:1% respectively for the lowest to high-
est quality groups. Thus the externality associated to schooling can be measured
as the di¤erence between these numbers and the private returns. Average excess
returns by groups of countries are reported in table 4. The results for each country
are reported in the appendix. In general, private returns are higher than the macro
ones.
Regarding the coe¢ cient for the k=y ratio, it is signicant at a 10% level in all
regressions except for the number 3. Among the regressions where it is signicant,
the implicit share of physical capital varies from 37:1% to 42:1%. This is consistent
with the typical estimates for the capital share.
8Group 3a is contains countries with quality lower than Fijis. The remaining countries are in group 3b.
The rationale for this classication is the drop in Sargans p-value when Fiji goes to the lower quality group
(see gure 1).
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To summarize these ndings, schooling quality appears to be an important de-
terminant of the social return on schooling. The results in table 3 show that there
is a high degree of heterogeneity. Countries with better quality display, on average,
higher coe¢ cients for years of schooling.
4 Income Accounting
The income accounting literature decomposes the di¤erences in levels of income per
worker across countries into di¤erences in factor accumulation and productivity. To
do so income per worker is typically expressed as a Cobb-Douglas: y = Akh1 
where A is total factor productivity (Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005)9. The main
nding in the literature is that factor accumulation explains only a minor share of
income disparities across countries. For instance Caselli (2005) shows that factor
accumulation only explains between 30% and 40% of cross-country income variance.
This result is robust to a number of checks and is consistent with earlier ndings by
Hall and Jones (1999). One key assumption of these papers is that in the human
capital function h = erS the parameter r is supposed to decrease with the numbers of
years of schooling. This is based on the estimated micro returns on schooling, which
are on average lower for countries with relatively higher educational attainment.
As seen in the previous section, there is no evidence of a link between private and
aggregate returns on schooling. In particular, the data does not reveal that countries
with higher levels of schooling have lower macro returns. Moreover, the estimates
above suggest that education quality plays an important role in the determination of
the macro returns on schooling. Earlier attempts to incorporate direct measures of
quality in development accounting are found in Gundlach, Rudman and Woessmann
(2002) and Woessmann (2003). However these papers also use the micro evidence
as proxies for the macro returns on schooling.
This section decomposes income per worker by incorporating the macro returns
obtained in the previous section. This is a key di¤erence with respect to the previous
literature because here the parameters are endogenously determined by macro data.
More concretely based on regression 5 in table 3 human capital h in year 1990 is
such that r = 0:7% for q < 0:450, r = 5:7% for 0:450  q < 0:635 and r = 12:8%
9Caselli and Coleman (2006) go beyond this standard framework by assuming imperfect substitution
between skilled and unskilled labour.
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for q > 0:635: Lets call this measure of human capital hs. As a benchmark lets
also construct h assuming the piecewise linear returns of Hall and Jones (1998)
and Caselli (2005) and call it hp. These two approaches are fundamentally di¤erent
because hs is obtained by assuming that r depends positively (and exclusively) on the
quality of schooling, whereas hp is obtained by assuming that r depends negatively
(and exclusively) on years of schooling. In spite of this di¤erence the correlation
between hs and hp is 92% (the correlation for lnh is 88%).
Caselli (2005) denes two measures to gauge the capacity of production factors
to account for income di¤erences across countries. The rst measure is
success1 =
var (ln ykh)
var (ln y)
where ln ykh   ln k + (1  ) lnh10: Thus success1 is the share of the income
variance across countries that can be explained by di¤erences in factor accumulation.
When human capital is measured by hp , success1 takes the value 0:37. In other
words, factor accumulation is able to explain only 37% of income variance across
countries. This is slightly lower than the value obtained by Caselli (2005) with a
di¤erent data set and year (he nds success1 = 0:39). In contrast if human capital is
measured by hs, success1 increases to 0:64. Thus by using measures for r based on
macro estimation, the ability of factor accumulation to explain cross-country income
di¤erences improves substantially. These results are summarized in table 5.
As variances are sensitive to outliers Caselli (2005) proposes computing an al-
ternative measure that is less a¤ected by such a problem. This measure is dened
as:
success2 =
y90kh=y
10
kh
y90=y10
where xp is the pth percentile of the distribution of x. Thus if the output gap
were totally explained by di¤erences in factors success2 would be equal to 1. When
success2 is calculated using hp it takes the value 0:32 (in Casellis paper it is 0:34).
But if human capital is measured by hs, success2 takes the value 0:51. Again,
10As in Casellis paper I assume that  = 1=3
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the data suggests that factor accumulation plays a larger role in explaining income
disparities across countries than is usually thought.
Note that although the use of macro returns in development accounting substan-
tially improves the role of factor accumulation in explaining cross-country income
di¤erences a substantial share of such di¤erences is still unaccounted for. This is
consistent with Caselli and Coleman (2006) who argue that technological choice
plays a large role in explaining income di¤erences across countries.
5 Earlier Evidence
The availability of historical data since the mid-nineties on both physical and human
capital stocks made it possible to directly estimate a production function. As is well
known, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) were the rst to show that schooling provides
non-signicant coe¢ cients in cross-country growth regressions. They estimate
y^i = A^i + k^i + h^i (8)
where y^i; k^i and h^i respectively stand for the growth rate of income, physical capital
and human capital per worker and A^i represents the growth rate of total factor
productivity over the 1965-1985 period. Human capital is represented by the labour
forces average years of schooling whether measured with Kyriacou (1991) or Barro
and Lee (1993) data. None of these measures turn out to be signicant in Benhabib
and Spiegels (1994) regressions. In contrast they nd that the level of schooling is
positively, though not always signicantly, correlated with growth11.
In Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) the income growth rate is regressed on the change
in the logarithm of years of schooling. Pritchett (2001) replicates these regressions
but with an expression for human capital inspired by Mincer (1974). He uses OLS
and instrumental variable methods to estimate regression (8). As in Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994), Pritchett nds a non-signicant , implying that changes in schooling
have had no impact on economic growth. Furthermore, a level regression for year
11The ndings by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) produced an empirical literature that postulates a growth-
on-level formulation. This literature, which is not addressed in this paper, is well represented by informal
growth regressions à la Barro. In these regressions the educational level is sometimes seen as a state variable,
i.e. a variable measuring the proximity to the steady state (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and sometimes
as a determinant of the steady-state itself (Barro, 1997). More recently, Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhoefer and
Miller (2004) found that primary school enrollment in 1960 is strongly correlated with growth during the
1960  1996 period.
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1985 also rejects the signicance of . However, the interpretation of this result
is di¤erent from the one given by Benhabib and Spiegel. Pritchett highlights the
institutional characteristics where increases in education have taken place and argues
that: i) the education provided has low quality and so it has not generated increases
in human capital; ii) the expansion in the supply of educated labour has surpassed
demand, leading to a decrease in the return on education; and iii) educated workers
may have gone into privately lucrative but socially unproductive activities.
However, even if all these phenomena are taking place simultaneously, they can
hardly be the reason behind the apparent lack of productivity of education in macro
empirical studies. First, it is di¢ cult to believe that the provision of education has
been of such a low quality in some countries that on average the world return is zero.
Moreover, as discussed in section 3, if countries with higher levels of schooling ben-
et from better quality and productivity of schooling, then standard cross-country
regressions would produce positively biased world average returns. So an argument
based on di¤erences in quality goes against Pritchetts (2001) hypothesis. Second,
even assuming that the supply of education has increased more rapidly than de-
mand, this cannot in itself imply that one additional year of schooling leads to a
null increase in production. And third, the hypothesis that most of the increases
in education have been devoted to socially unproductive activities around the world
which would be necessary to explain a null global returnis simply at odds with re-
ality: we do observe that more educated people are employed in better-remunerated
activities, which themselves are registered in the national account systems. Again,
this simple observation does not mean that all skilled workers are devoted to socially
productive activities, but the opposite is not true either.
Temple (2001) has revisited Pritchetts results with di¤erent assumptions about
the human capital function. However none of these yielded signicant coe¢ cients at
standard levels of condence. Temple concludes that [. . . ] the aggregate evidence
on education and growth, for large sample of countries, continues to be clouded with
uncertainty.
The systematic failure of cross-country regressions to display positive e¤ects of
education has led to some researchers to question about the quality of the data on
education. Topel (1999) and Krueger and Lindahl (2001) argue that measurement
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error in the number of years of schooling is a major cause of the apparent lack of sig-
nicance of changes in schooling in growth regressions. In these papers the authors
report panel data results for various specications of growth regressions. The years
of schooling variable is from Barro and Lee (1993), which according to Krueger and
Lindahl, has less measurement error than Kyriacous (1991) data. Consistent with
the earlier literature they nd that changes in schooling are signicant only when
physical capital is omitted from the regressions or when its coe¢ cient is constrained.
Krueger and Lindahl argue that measurement error in years of schooling is exacer-
bated by the inclusion of physical capital, hence the lack of signicance of schooling
in the regression with physical capital. Thus they conclude that: Overall, unless
measurement error problems in schooling are overcome, we doubt that cross-country
growth equations that control for capital growth will be very informative insofar as
the benet of education is concerned.
Cohen and Soto (2007) present a new data set for years of schooling for a broad
group of countries. They also provide preliminary evidence that the new series
provide signicant results for schooling in a panel of countries, while in the same
regressions with Barro and Lees (2001) data the schooling variable is not signicant.
One key point that is not accounted for in the empirical literature is that there is
substantial heterogeneity in the returns across countries. Moreover, based on labour
studies results the development accounting literature assumes that the macro returns
are relatively higher in countries with lower levels of schooling (Hall and Jones, 1999;
Caselli, 2005). This hypothesis is rejected by the evidence presented here.
6 Conclusions
This paper has revisited the empirical link between years of schooling and GDP
per worker. In the borderline panel regression for 83 countries the coe¢ cient for
schooling is highly signicant. When the estimates are converted into a Mincer-
equivalent coe¢ cient we obtain a return equal to 8:3%. This coe¢ cient must not
be interpreted as an internal rate of return of schooling but as the causal e¤ect of
schooling on income per worker, for a given level of physical capital per worker. With
this caveat in mind the estimates suggest the absence of externalities to education,
which is consistent with the ndings based on wage regressions by Heckman, Layne-
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Farrar and Todd (1996), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) or Ciccone and Peri (2006).
This is also consistent with the macro regressions of Heckman and Klenow (1997),
Topel (1999) and Cohen and Soto (2007).
However, these regressions conceal the fact that there is substantial return het-
erogeneity across countries. When the regressions allow for return heterogeneity
depending on the quality of schooling as measured by Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
countries with higher quality have on average higher returns whereas the coe¢ cient
for the lowest quality group is virtually equal to (and not statistically di¤erent from)
zero.
On the other hand, when countries are classied according to the private returns
on schooling as measured by Psacharopoulos (1994) and Psacharopoulos and Patri-
nos (2004), the social Mincer coe¢ cient is not higher in countries with higher private
Mincer coe¢ cients. This suggests that private and social returns on education bear
little or no relationship.
One important implication of these results is that the income accounting liter-
ature that uses micro returns to build measures of aggregate human capital stocks
underestimates the role of human capital in explaining income di¤erences across
countries. For instance Hall and Jones (1999) assume a piecewise linear return,
which is decreasing in the number of years of schooling. This leads them to nd
that human capital in India is 45:4% of the US level in 1988. With the estimates
in table 5 where a country like India gets a much lower return than the USthe
ratio of human capital in India to the US falls to about 26%. Consequently this
paper provides empirical support for schooling quality as an important determinant
of income disparities across countries.
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Appendix A
In section 2 it is argued that in order to evaluate the presence of externalities in
years of schooling we must compare the private Mincerian return with (1  ) r. To
illustrate this result lets consider for simplicity a large number of identical rms
operating under perfect competition and absence of externalities. In this case a
unit of human capital is paid its marginal productivity @Y@H where Y and H are
respectively aggregate output and human capital. Thus a worker j with h(Sj)
units of human capital gets a salary wj = @Y@Hh(S
j). With the production function
Y = AKH1  the salary perceived by worker j is such that:
lnwj = ln(1  ) + ln(A) +  lnK    lnH + lnhj
Suppose that there are n workers and that total human capital is such that H =
nX
l=1
hl. So the equilibrium salary for worker j can be written as:
lnwj = ln(1  ) + ln(A) +  lnK    ln
nX
l 6=j
hl + (1  ) lnhj (9)
Expression (9) represents the salary that worker j gets under perfect competition
and lack of externalities. In such a context the marginal e¤ect of schooling on lnwj
is equal to (1  )@ lnhj
@Sj
.
On the other hand the standard wage equation is a function of years of schooling
S and experience x as follows (see for example Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2005):
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lnwj = a0 + S
j + 0x
j + 1x
j2 + ej (10)
Equation (10) describes the equilibrium salary received by a worker with school-
ing Sj and experience xj . In this equation  is the micro Mincerian return on
schooling, dened as the percentage increase in the wage caused by an increase in
the level of schooling. Thus in the absence of externalities equations (9) and (10)
are consistent only if
(1  ) @ lnh
j
@Sj
= 
or equivalently,
lnhj =

(1  )S
j + "j (11)
where "j is a residual independent from Sj . Therefore with an arbitrarily skewed
distribution of schooling, average human capital per worker h is such that:
lnh  
(1  )S + " (12)
where S is average schooling and " is an aggregation of "j . Thus under the hypoth-
esis of the absence of human capital externalities, from expression (12) and (2) we
conclude that  = (1  ) r.
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Table 1: Benchmark Estimation 
 
Dependent variable is ln(GDP per worker) 
(83 countries; 1960-1990) 
 
 OLS 
(Levels) 
(1) 
OLS 
(Differences) 
(2) 
GMM 
(System 1) 
(3) 
GMM 
(System 2) 
(4) - Baseline 
Observations 313 230 313 313 
Log of capital-output ratio 0.221 b -0.213 b 0.843 b 0.859 b 
 (0.112) (0.105) (0.340) (0.349) 
Years of schooling 0.217 a 0.093 b 0.136 b 0.155 a 
 (0.024) (0.044) (0.058) (0.054) 
Implicit capital share 0.181 -0.271 0.457 0.462 
Implicit Mincerian return 0.178 0.118 0.074 0.083 
Sargan (p-values) − − 0.132 0.176 
2nd order serial correl. (p-values) − − 0.743 0.804 
Notes: GDP per worker from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; stock of physical capital per 
worker from Easterly and Levine (2001); years of schooling from Cohen and Soto (2007). Time 
dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step GMM 
coefficients (one-step standard errors). See main text on the selection of instruments for GMM 
estimation. 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 2: Effect of schooling by size of private Mincer coefficient (m) 
 
Dependent variable is ln(GDP per worker) 
(System GMM estimation, 55 countries, 1960-1990) 
 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Log of capital-output ratio 0.928 b 0.661 c 0.958 b 
 (0.432) (0.347) (0.419) 
Years of schooling (all countries) 0.139 a   
 (0.051)   
Years of schooling (countries with m < 0.08)  0.129 a  
  (0.040)  
Years of schooling (countries with 0.08 ≤ m < 0.11)  0.138 a  
  (0.050)  
Years of schooling (countries with  0.11 ≤ m )  0.082 0.066 
  (0.056) (0.060) 
Years of schooling (countries with m < 0.11)   0.120 b 
   (0.048) 
Implicit share of physical capital 0.481 0.398 0.489 
Implicit social Mincerian coefficient in: 
All countries 
Countries with m < 0.08 
Countries with 0.08 ≤ m < 0.11 
Countries with  0.11 ≤ m 
 
0.072 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
0.078 
0.083 
0.049 
 
-- 
0.061 
0.061 
0.034 
Sargan (p-values) 0.016 0.073 0.056 
2nd order serial correlelation (p-values) 0.616 0.713 0.672 
Notes: 214 observations. GDP per worker from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; stock of physical capital 
per worker from Easterly and Levine (2001); years of schooling from Cohen and Soto (2007); private 
Mincer coefficient (m) from Psacharopoulos (2002) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). Time 
dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step GMM coefficients (one-step 
standard errors). See main text on the selection of instruments. 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 3: Effect of schooling by quality of education (q) 
 
Dependent variable is ln(GDP per worker) 
(System GMM estimation, 67 countries, 1960-1990) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
Log of capital-output ratio 0.726 c 0.601 c 0.506 0.643 c 0.589 c 
 (0.416) (0.322) (0.374) (0.361) (0.311) 
Years of schooling in:      
 All countries 0.145 b     
 (0.057)     
Countries with q < 0.450  -0.023  0.024 0.007 
  (0.084)  (0.072) (0.083) 
Countries with 0.450 ≤ q < 0.633  0.030   0.057 
  (0.083)   (0.081) 
Countries with 0.633 ≤ q  0.104 b 0.121 b   
  (0.046) (0.048)   
Countries with q < 0.633   0.032   
   (0.082)   
Countries with 0.450 ≤ q    0.123 b  
    (0.052)  
Countries with 0.633 ≤ q < 0.835     0.129 a 
     (0.047) 
Countries with 0.835 ≤ q     0.128 a 
     (0.040) 
Implicit capital share 0.421 0.375 0.336 0.391 0.371 
Sargan (p-values) 0.084 0.255 0.321 0.177 0.289 
2nd order serial correl. (p-values) 0.683 0.595 0.629 0.636 0.573 
      
Notes: 257 observations. GDP per worker from Summers and Heston, PWT 5.6; stock of physical 
capital per worker from Easterly and Levine (2001); years of schooling from Cohen and Soto 
(2007); quality of education from Hanushek and Kimko (2000) as percentage of quality in 
Singapore. Time dummies included (not reported). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 2-step 
GMM coefficients (one-step standard errors). See main text on the selection of instruments. 
a, b, c: coefficients are significant at a 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 4. Social and private Mincerian coefficients 
by quality of education 
 
 
Quality Group Average 
social Mincer 
coefficient 
Average 
private  Mincer 
coefficient 
Difference 
q  < 0.450 0.004 0.102 −0.098 
    
0.450 ≤  q < 0.633 0.036 0.112 −0.076 
    
0.633 ≤ q <  0.835 0.081 0.092 −0.010 
    
0.835 ≤ q 0.081 0.089 −0.008 
 
Table 5. Income decomposition (1990) 
 
 Assuming hs Assuming hp Caselli (2005)
estimation 
Var(ln ykh)/Var(ln y) 0.64 0.37 0.39 
    
(ykh
90/ykh
10)/(y90/y10) 0.51 0.32 0.34 
 
ykh= factor accumulation; y = GDP per worker; x
p = pth percentile of the distribution of x. 
“Assuming hs”: Factor accumulation is calculated assuming that human capital is hs 
“Assuming hp”: Factor accumulation is calculated assuming that human capital is hp 
Figure 1: Sargan test (p-values) in recursive estimation 
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Countries ranked by educational quality (higher quality on the right)  
 
Note: A low p-value suggests that the country’s return on schooling is significantly different from the 
average return in countries with lower educational quality. 
